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INTRODUCTION
Since 2014, President Joko Widodo proposed Indone-
sia as being a centre of maritime and economic activity in
the Indo-Pacific due to its lucrative geostrategic position
in global maritime trade. At the 9th East Asia Summit, Joko
Widodo iterated the five pillars of the Global Maritime
Fulcrum (GMF), which includes maritime culture,
economy, infrastructure, diplomacy, and defence. In the
2017 Indonesian Ocean Policy document, the initial five pil-
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Abstrak
Poros Maritim Dunia menjadi landasan penting politik luar negeri dan dalam negeri Indonesia pada masa kepemimpinan Presiden Joko
Widodo. Indonesia dibayangkan sebagai kekuatan maritim regional yang mampu menjaga keamanan di wilayah maritimnya sendiri dan
wilayah Indo-Pasifik. Ini menunjukkan ambisi Indonesia yang menginginkan peningkatan ekonomi dari sektor maritim. Poros Maritim Dunia
bentukan Presiden Joko Widodo telah berjalan selama tiga tahun. Meskipun dapat dilihat pembangunan secara fisik yang luar biasa, akan
tetapi pembangunan kesadaran maritim atau MDA masih kurang diperhatikan. Sebagai dasar dari kebijakan maritim, menjadi penting bagi
Indonesia untuk memastikan kapasitas pembangunan MDA yang memadai guna memberikan arah pemangku kepentingan dalam
mengalokasikan dan memprioritaskan sumber daya. Tulisan ini membangun sebuah kerangka MDA untuk mengevaluasi pembangunan
MDA Indonesia di tiga level: strategis, operasional, dan teknis. Kerangka ini mengidentifikasi tiga permasalahan, antara lain kurangnya
kapasitas untuk mengadakan operasional MDA yang berkelanjutan, kurangnya koordinasi antar agensi, serta permasalahan pemahaman
mengenai kemaritiman. Pada bagian akhir, tulisan ini memberikan beberapa rekomendasi yang bertujuan meningkatkan kapasitas Indonesia
untuk membangun MDA.
Kata kunci: Kewaspadaan Lingkungan Maritim, Poros Maritim Dunia, kebijakan maritim Indonesia, keamanan maritim, pembangunan angkatan
laut.
Abstract
The Global Maritime Fulcrum has been an essential cornerstone of Indonesian foreign and domestic policy for the Joko Widodo administra-
tion. It envisions Indonesia as a regional maritime power capable of providing maritime security within its territorial waters and the Indo-
Pacific region. It also captures Indonesia's ambition to boost its maritime economy. The Joko Widodo administration has been building the
Global Maritime Fulcrum for three years. Though physical development has indeed been remarkable, there has been a lack of a focus on
developing maritime domain awareness or MDA. As an essential foundation of maritime policy, it is important that a state invests in ensuring
adequate MDA-building capacities to guide its maritime policy. Without proper MDA, it would be difficult for maritime stakeholders to
allocate and prioritise maritime resources to the key areas of concern of the Global Maritime Fulcrum. This paper constructs a framework of
MDA, which is used to examine the issues with Indonesia's MDA-building process at three levels: strategic, operational, and technical. It
identifies three issues, namely a lack of capacity to conduct sustained MDA operations, a lack of inter-agency coordination, and the problem
of maritime 'sense-making.' Several policy recommendations aimed at increasing Indonesia's capacity to build MDA are proposed at the end.
Keywords: maritime domain awareness, Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia maritime policy, maritime security, naval development.
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lars have been reiterated and expanded to include (1) ma-
rine and human resources development, (2) maritime se-
curity, law enforcement, and safety at sea, (3) ocean gover-
nance and institutions, (4) maritime economy develop-
ment, (5) sea space management and marine protection,
(6) maritime culture, and (7) maritime diplomacy. An ad-
ditional six principles on which the Ocean Policy will be
carried out on, which includes (1) Wawasan Nusantara (Ar-
chipelagic Outlook), (2) sustainable development, (3) blue
economy, (4) integrated and transparent management, (5)
participation, and (6) equality and equitability (Indone-
sian Ocean Policy (Presidential Decree of the Republic of
Indonesia no. 16/2017), 2017).
The overall goals of the GMF are strategic and economic
in nature (Agastia and Perwita, 2015). Jokowi’s GMF envi-
sions the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) as being a regional
green-water navy capable of handling security threats within
and beyond Indonesian territorial waters. Upholding mari-
time security is an essential prerequisite for the fulfilment
of the latter pillars, which are largely economic. The eco-
nomic goals work at both the domestic and international
level. These ambitions are reflected in Joko Widodo’s
ambitions in creating a ‘sea highway’ (tol laut), which com-
prises of large vessels capable of transporting large amounts
of cargo and people. The end goal at the domestic level is
to accelerate and ensure equal economic development
across the archipelago by increasing inter-island connec-
tivity. At the regional level, accelerating development of
domestic maritime infrastructure is expected to better link
Indonesian ports and harbours with international mari-
time trade routes and sea lanes of communication (SLOCs),
particularly those spanning the Indo-Pacific.
Seeing these ambitions, there is an urgency for Indo-
nesia to improve its maritime domain awareness (MDA)
capabilities. For the purposes of this paper, the concept of
MDA generally refers to having a comprehensive under-
standing of the maritime environment, which encompasses
the physical/material and immaterial aspects such as (but
not limited to) maritime traffic, geography, legal jurisdic-
tions, and extent of maritime territory. From that under-
standing, maritime stakeholders allow the formulation of
tactical/technical, operational, and strategic decisions as a
means to further the national interest. Without proper
MDA, it would be difficult for stakeholders to prioritise
and allocate maritime resources to the key areas of con-
cern of the GMF. As an illustration, constructing a sus-
tainable maritime economy through fisheries would be
difficult if those fisheries are not monitored adequately.
The stakeholders would need to be able to monitor for
potential violations – e.g. illegal fishing, use of prohibited
fishing methods, etc. – and ensure adequate enforcement.
These activities require extensive MDA capabilities which
Indonesia continues to lack.
Marsetio has emphasised the importance of develop-
ing Indonesia’s MDA capabilities due to Indonesia’s geo-
political position (Marsetio, 2014, pp. 55-57). Indonesia is
situated between the Indian and Pacific Ocean which hosts
some of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.
Some areas of interest in Indonesia’s vicinity include the
Malacca Strait, a crowded and narrow maritime sea lane
of communication that is prone to piracy and armed rob-
bery; the contested South China Sea, which over the years
has seen simmering tensions between China and claim-
ant states; and the Sulu Sea, which has recently seen an
increase in piracy incidents (Connelly, 2015; E. A.
Laksmana, 2011).
Better MDA capabilities would allow Indonesia to for-
mulate better maritime policy. Official documents tend to
emphasise the end objectives of the GMF instead of the
means for achieving the GMF. In the 2015 Defence White
Paper, there are expectations to build a maritime surveil-
lance system using ‘satellites and drones’; however, further
elaboration on the specific details of implementation re-
main unclear (Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indo-
nesia, 2015). The 2017 Indonesian Ocean Policy document
also fails to elaborate the implementation of a possible
maritime surveillance network that is necessary for build-
ing MDA capabilities. There is little mention of how the
government intends on funding such a network, yet it
emphasises the importance of being aware of the mari-
time domain. Furthermore, the document tells little of
how Indonesia is expected to direct the thirteen agencies
share varying degrees of authority in maritime security
governance (Salim, 2015). While there seems to be con-
sensus that Indonesia needs to increase its MDA capabili-
ties as a requisite for fulfilling its maritime ambitions, a
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comprehensive framework or roadmap that combines
analyses at the strategic, operational, and technical levels
of MDA remains to be seen.
 Thus, this paper argues that Indonesia’s naval devel-
opment requires a comprehensive understanding of MDA
to achieve its fullest potential. While physical development
is indeed necessary for Indonesia to become a regional
maritime power, MDA – which is a fundamental strategic
concept in maritime development – also need to be devel-
oped. The importance of developing MDA lies in its guid-
ing and directive power over physical maritime assets.
Without building proper MDA, maritime development
risks progressing based on political whims rather than
proper understanding of the maritime domain. In this
paper, we propose a framework of building MDA. It seeks
to illustrate the actors and objects in the MDA-building
process at the technical, operational, and strategic level.
Using the framework, it is then possible to (1) identify the
limitations in the MDA-building process in Indonesia, and
(2) provide recommendations to address these limitations
in the MDA-building process.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS
UNDERSTANDING MDA AS A CONCEPT
As with the term ‘maritime security’, maritime domain
awareness continues to spark debate over its exact defini-
tion (Bueger, 2015b). The differences in defining MDA
usually stem from the context of its usage. Generally, there
are three levels at which MDA is understood. In the tech-
nical domain, MDA originates from the practice of identi-
fying and targeting the naval opposition. ‘Awareness’ is
often limited to a vessel’s immediate surroundings or ‘mari-
time situational awareness’ (Watts, 2006). Moving up to
the operational level, MDA includes ‘sufficient capacity
for sufficient surveillance and awareness across particular
sea areas.’ At the higher strategic level, MDA can be gener-
ally understood as the capacity for policy-makers to under-
stand the maritime environment and its traditional and
non-traditional security dynamics which may affect the state
either directly or indirectly. As stated in the National Secu-
rity Presidential Directive 41 (NSPD-41), MDA is ‘…the ef-
fective understanding of anything associated with the glo-
bal Maritime Domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States.’ (National
Security Presidential Directive NSPD-41/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive HSPD-13, December 2004)
Based on these interpretations, MDA is essentially an
enabler for the formulation and implementation of mari-
time policy. Having MDA means having the capability to
understand the geostrategic benefits of the sea for the ben-
efit of the state. This includes awareness and understand-
ing of the utilisation of strategic maritime resources, such
as (but not limited to) fisheries, domestic and regional
maritime trade routes, and offshore energy resources. This
knowledge will be the basis of maritime policy. In imple-
menting maritime policy, MDA requires the capacity to
exploit the sea for maximum utility. This means that mari-
time agencies ought to be capable of building awareness
through information gathering and surveillance and then
acting upon that intelligence. They are also required to be
able to share that intelligence with fellow agencies (hori-
zontal sharing) and with policymaking agencies (vertical
sharing) to ensure an appropriate response can be formu-
lated. This is especially important in states where there are
many maritime security agencies operate simultaneously,
such as Indonesia. Equipped with intelligence gained at
the operational and technical levels, policymakers will be
able to know how to use the sea and how to direct and
guide the physical element – i.e. naval forces and their
auxiliaries – to achieve maximum utility of the sea in both
domestic and foreign policy.
Possessing sufficient MDA entails three important ben-
efits. Firstly, policymakers will be able to allocate appro-
priate maritime resources to key areas of maritime secu-
rity. If intelligence at the operational and technical levels
suggests a spike in pirate activities in a vital area, swift policy
changes ought to be made as a response. The implementa-
tion of such decision may take form in the mobilisation of
more naval or coast guard vessels, increased surveillance,
or requesting assistance to an existing multilateral network.
Second, sufficient MDA also means that policymakers
know the limits of their naval capabilities, thus allowing
them to not implement policies that are beyond their reach.
It also allows policymakers to prioritise. If intelligence at
the lower levels suggest a shortage in naval vessels and sur-
veillance capabilities at the border areas, policymakers
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would then should not embark on policies that could leave
maritime security compromised and instead consider op-
tions of fleet modernisation. Third, the policymakers will
be able to understand trends and patterns in the maritime
domain and adjust their policies to anticipate future trends
to the best of their capacity.
A FRAMEWORK FOR MDA
In this section, we propose a comprehensive framework
that shows how MDA can enable the formulation and
implementation of a state’s maritime policy. Some terms
used in the framework ought to be elaborated. The ‘mari-
time domain’ is understood as a three-dimensional mari-
time space, including the ‘areas and things of, on, under,
relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or
other navigable waterway’ along with its both material and
immaterial features. Material features include, but are not
limited to, features of maritime topography (particularly
undersea and sea-level features), the presence of maritime
vessels or infrastructure (offshore platforms, ports,
harbours, etc.), and movement of maritime vessels within
the maritime domain. This has been illustrated aptly in
Boraz’s interpretation of MDA as,
…finding the ships and submarines of friends and foes,
understanding the entire supply chain of cargoes, identify-
ing people aboard vessels, understanding the infrastructures
within or astride the maritime domain, and identifying
anomalies and potential threats in all these areas (Boraz,
2009, p. 141).
Yet, Boraz’s definition remains incomplete as it does
not fully regard the political aspect of the maritime do-
main. The states need to increasingly take heed of existing
political and/or legal instruments which could be used to
legitimise their utilisation of the maritime domain. Such
instruments include the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, COLREGS, the ISPS Code, or the 1995 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement. As such, this framework adds an im-
material layer to the maritime domain which includes the
political-legal aspects that permeates the maritime domain
which influences the way a state may decide to adjust their
maritime strategy. These may include (but not limited to)
acknowledgement and implementation (or lack thereof)
of the international law of the sea within a particular mari-
time domain, a state’s maritime boundaries and probable
contestations, and the imposition of restricted zones in a
specific maritime domain. By incorporating both material
and immaterial factors of the maritime domain, a clearer
and more comprehensive ‘maritime image’ can be con-
structed, resulting in better MDA (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Maritime Domain Awareness Building
Loop
At the lowest technical level, the MDA-building pro-
cess is concerned mostly with maritime situational aware-
ness, or gathering information on the material elements
of the maritime domain. Should the need arise, the agency
in question may act to counter the identified threat. The
MDA process at this level is simply being aware of one’s
maritime surroundings and acting based on that aware-
ness. This level is mostly limited to the individual agency,
such as the naval patrol vessel out at sea or coastal surveil-
lance stations.
Moving up to the operational level or the middle rung
of the ladder, the process of MDA-building becomes sig-
nificantly more complex. The functions carried out at this
level, in some ways, are similar to the technical level with
an added layer of coordination and processing. Agencies
at the operational level (henceforth, operational agencies)
are concerned not only with the identification of threats,
but also prioritisation (‘Does this threat matter?’) and in-
formation gathering. To do this, operational agencies have
to consult the priorities set at the strategic level, until then
deciding whether to act upon that threat through the avail-
able means. At this level, operational agencies need to be
capable of understanding the extent of which the material
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and immaterial elements of the maritime domain may in-
fluence a particular decision.
One important task in MDA-building process at the
operational level is the processing and compiling of infor-
mation. As ships (both naval and civilian) at sea travel,
operational agencies monitor their routes and receive re-
ports and updates as they travel along their respective
routes. At this level, the broad term ‘information’ becomes
significant. ‘Information’ can be differentiated into three
broad types: incidents, movements, and sensitive data such
as naval intelligence or criminal investigations (Bueger,
2015a). Incidents at sea encompasses many instances, such
as actual or attempted piracy, ship collisions, and
transnational crimes. Information on movements allow the
state to monitor its waterways and measure the volume of
traffic. Sensitive data may be used to further pinpoint po-
tential maritime threats. Combined together, this allows
the operational agencies to construct a rudimentary ‘mari-
time image’ that incorporates trends and patterns drawn
from information on movements and incidents of mari-
time vessels within the specified maritime domain. One
example includes results from MDA information-sharing
centres such as the ReCAAP ISP Annual Report, which
reports on piracy incidents in Southeast Asia.
However, this ‘maritime image’ is not enough. Amidst
the cacophony of incident reports, movements, and sensi-
tive information, operational agencies also need to fulfil a
coordination and aggregation role. The collection of in-
formation on the maritime domain can hardly be con-
ducted by a single agency; instead, many agencies – both
military and civilian, government and non-government,
national and international – are involved. The operational
agencies are the ones who will coordinate these agencies
so information-gathering activities at the technical level
are directed towards a predefined agenda set at the strate-
gic level. Sifting through these often complex networks
and piecing together meaningful information into a co-
herent ‘maritime image’ is perhaps the most important
task conducted at the operational level.
The ‘maritime image’ constructed at the operational
level can further be refined and utilised at the strategic
level. Policymaking requires the knowledge of the mari-
time domain gathered at the operational level, added with
strategic analyses. Three core aspects of strategic MDA re-
quire understanding and knowledge of (1) the state’s own
maritime capabilities, (2) the strategic utility of the mari-
time domain, and (3) the trends and patterns occurring in
the maritime domain. Based on this knowledge, the stra-
tegic level then outlines the priorities for the state’s mari-
time strategy. For example, if the trends show an increase
in activities related to piracy that have a direct impact on a
state’s maritime trade, at the strategic level, piracy ought
to be prioritised in maritime strategy. In informing mari-
time policy, policymakers ought to engage routinely with
informed advisers (Till, 2015). The task of establishing
maritime governance is yet another important task at the
strategic level. This includes creating a structure that en-
sures coordination and cooperation among the many agen-
cies involved in building MDA, such as the navy, coast
guard, and other civilian institutions. The end goal is to
ensure that the MDA-building process operates smoothly
without any hindrances at any levels.
ANALYSIS
Once maritime strategy has been formulated, it is then
implemented into the maritime domain. The state then
continues its usual MDA-building loop, by which it also
evaluates the changes in the maritime domain caused by
the implementation of the maritime strategy. This feed-
back is collected either at the operational or technical level
and then assessed at the strategic level. Thus, the state con-
tinues to adjust its maritime strategy according to its knowl-
edge of the maritime domain.
LIMITATIONS TO BUILD MDA IN INDONESIA
Three problems have been highlighted, namely (1) the
lack of capacity to gather and process information, (2) lack
of inter-agency cooperation and coordination, and (3) lack
of ‘sense-making’ resources.
Lack of Capacity to Gather and Process Information
At the operational and technical levels, creating the
‘maritime image’ requires equipment such as naval ves-
sels, imaging technology, and information-sharing technol-
ogy. There are thirteen agencies that are involved in safe-
guarding Indonesian waters and enforcing maritime secu-
rity. However, these agencies often have to compete with
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one another for funding and resources. Some major agen-
cies include the Navy, Marine Police (Polair), and Customs
(Meliala, Ariando, Kusumo, Hartati, & Fatoni, 2016). The
recently-established Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla)
is also promising, however, it still suffers from a lack of
equipment and manpower, for which it still needs to be
dependent on the Navy (CNN Indonesia, 31 August 2016).
The Navy remains the most important actor in the
MDA-building process, especially at the operational and
technical level. Although the Navy is the most resourceful
agency out of the thirteen maritime agencies, it still suf-
fers from a lack of equipment. One of the primary tools in
building MDA is naval vessels, as they can serve multiple
roles. In building MDA, naval vessels serve the dual-role
of defence and intelligence gathering. Currently, the Navy
is struggling with both these roles. According to Minimum
Essential Force (MEF) projections, the Navy requires at
least 154 vessels to maintain maritime security by 2024,
with an optimal scenario of 274 vessels (Koh, 2015). To
achieve MEF goals, Indonesia has been actively acquiring
new naval vessels to replace its ageing fleet (Bakrie, 2009).
In 2011, Indonesia signed a deal to purchase three Type-
209 Chang Bogo diesel submarines from South Korean
shipbuilding company, DSME (Afrida, 10 November 2016).
In 2014, PT PAL and Damen Scheide Naval Shipbuilding
(DSNS) agreed to jointly produce two Sigma guided-mis-
sile corvettes. The first vessel, the KRI Radden Eddy
Martadinata, has completed sea trials in 2016 and has been
handed over to the Navy in January 2017, while the sec-
ond is expected to be handed over by the end of 2017
(ANTARA, 7 April 2017). The BAKAMLA has also placed
an order for a 110m offshore patrol vessel (OPV), which is
expected to bolster its capabilities as a Coast Guard
(Rahmat, December 2016).
Building MDA also requires sophisticated imaging and
sensors technology. In the 2015 Defence White Book, In-
donesia has outlined a vision of establishing an archipelago-
wide maritime surveillance system using drones and satel-
lites to support the Global Maritime Fulcrum, however,
the current surveillance system relies mostly on radar (De-
fence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015, p. 2).
Although efforts to create an Integrated Maritime Surveil-
lance System (IMSS) have begun since 2008 with aid from
the United States, the program has met some hurdles,
particularly in the maintenance and operation of the equip-
ment. The jointly-established IMSS covers the Malacca
Strait, Makassar Strait, and the Moluccas Strait and com-
prises of 18 coastal surveillance stations (CSS), 11 ship-
based radars, 2 regional command centres, and 2 fleet com-
mand centres (Febrica, 2017, pp. 105-106). As the producer
of the equipment, the U.S. enacted a restriction on main-
tenance. Repairs on IMSS equipment could only be car-
ried out under the permission of the United States. Dur-
ing a working visit to Riau in 2011, the radar at the Dumai
naval base in Riau – part of the 18 IMSS coastal surveil-
lance stations – was found to be damaged. The Navy could
not repair them independently due to US restrictions, yet
they could not afford to send the radar in for repairs. The
First Commission recommended the naval base to inde-
pendently carry out repairs as the radar was a vital piece of
equipment (Parliament of Indonesia, 2011b).
In another Working Visit in 2011 to Central Sulawesi,
the Commission I found that the radar installed at the
Palu naval base could only operate for two-thirds of a day
and is heavily dependent on power supply from the state-
owned power company. The Commission I also found that
the base was undermanned, further limiting the capabili-
ties of a naval base responsible for monitoring Archipe-
lagic Sea Lanes II and III. (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia;
ALKI) (Parliament of Indonesia, 2011a).1 In a 2010 visit to
Tanjung Pinang naval base, located near the Malacca Strait,
Commission I found that the base only possessed one ra-
dar which operated 24 hours non-stop and was supplied
by electricity from a generator. These conditions caused
the radar to not operate at maximum efficiency. Commis-
sion I thus recommended to acquire more radar units and
connect the existing radar to the national energy grid (Par-
liament of Indonesia, 2010).
The Navy also continues to struggle with logistical is-
sues. Working Visit Reports by Commission I of the Par-
liament indicate the Navy has been struggling with lim-
ited fuel and energy supplies to sustain naval operations
and a lack of manpower and vessels for various duties, in-
cluding operating surveillance equipment and sea patrols.
Soldier welfare was also found to be substandard, with re-
ports of delayed remuneration and unsatisfactory living
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conditions within the base. In a 2009 Working Visit to
Riau, Commission I found that the Tanjung Pinang Main
Naval Base often faced fuel shortages, which negatively
affects the Navy’s operational readiness (Parliament of In-
donesia, 2009). The subsequent Specific Visit Report in
2010 provides the following details regarding the state of
the Marines’ living standards on Nipah Island, one of the
outermost islands in Indonesia’s territory near Singapore:
The barracks have been repaired, but the repairs are
unsatisfactory. The walls are constructed from plywood or
asbestos, and thus, the barracks could not be used as pro-
tective cover should an attack occur. The inside of the bar-
racks was also very hot due to the low ceiling and lack of
air conditioning. There are no sources of clean drinking
water. The soldiers drink distilled seawater, but according
to lab results, the water does not meet healthy drinking
water standards. Regular shipments of drinking water are
dropped off from neighbouring areas using the Navy’s ves-
sels or traditional vessels. […] Communications equipment
are lacking and are heavily affected by bad weather. […]
The SS1 rifles are in poor condition. Soldiers also do not
possess means of transportation. The three motor boats
are damaged and cannot be used. […] Daily meal allow-
ances are considered inadequate, with each soldier only
provided Rp 25,000 daily (around US$ 2). […] There are
also no healthcare facilities. If a soldier falls ill, they have
to wait for transportation to Batam either via Navy trans-
port or fishing boat (Parliament of Indonesia, 2010, pp. 9-
11).
Equipment and logistical issues mean that at the tech-
nical level, the MDA-building process occurs slowly and
inadequately. Without quick and proper situational aware-
ness, the Navy becomes severely limited in their capability
to address potential maritime security threats. At the higher
levels, this delays the formation of a coherent ‘maritime
image’ which has further impacts on policy. It then be-
comes even more difficult to envision an integrated mari-
time surveillance system using drones and satellites.
Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination
Building MDA ought to be a cooperative venture that
involves many agencies within the government, smooth
communication is essential so the many agencies can carry
out their duties in a coordinated manner. A lack of coor-
dination and cooperation may result in the production of
a distorted ‘maritime image’, which has ramifications in
the making of maritime policy. At the higher strategic level,
the conflicting interests occurring at the operational-tech-
nical levels may potentially undermine efforts to build a
coherent ‘maritime image’.
There are several major actors that are heavily involved
in the MDA-building process, namely the Navy as part of
the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Fisheries
and Maritime Affairs (MOFMA), and the Maritime Secu-
rity Agency (Badan Keamanan Laut; BAKAMLA). Among
these agencies, the Bakamla was formed to improve infor-
mation-sharing between maritime stakeholders, along with
the added authority to deploy maritime resources in line
with its threefold mission of realizing national and inter-
national maritime security, safeguarding Indonesia’s sov-
ereignty, and strengthening Indonesia’s maritime capabili-
ties. Along with added authority, the Bakamla has also
been equipped with additional personnel and vessels.2
Joko Widodo’s intent was to transform the Bakamla
into the equivalent of an Indonesian Coast Guard, capable
of coordinating the twelve maritime security agencies.
However, the agency has so far been powerless in breaking
down institutional silos, which have persisted since the
New Order and are exacerbated by internal competition
and legal turf wars (Supriyanto and Rusdi, 2 January 2013).
Friction tends to occur between the Navy, Customs, and
Police due to the overlapping investigative authorities be-
stowed upon the agencies based on existing regulations.
Each agency may claim jurisdiction over maritime law en-
forcement duties, which leads to less cooperation and a
tendency to be involved in legal ‘turf wars. A potential
clash of authority may occur between the Bakamla, Navy,
and Marine Police. Law no. 34/2000 provides the Navy
with the authority to conduct maritime law enforcement
operations within Indonesia’s territorial waters and EEZ.
The same authority is also provided to Bakamla, in coordi-
nation with the Marine Police, under Presidential Regula-
tion no. 178/2014 and Law no. 32/2014. Coincidentally,
Law no. 32/2014 provides similar authority for the Minis-
try of Transportation’s Sea and Coastal Unit (Kesatuan
Penjaga Laut dan Pantai; KPLP), the Ministry of Fisheries’
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Civil Service Investigations Unit, and the Customs (Agastia,
2017). At the operational level, whose authority ought to
supersede the other in the rare case these agencies meet
simultaneously?
Ideally, there ought to be a single maritime security
agency that can coordinate maritime security activities. At
the moment, the Bakamla is being fitted to fulfil this role.
A single coordinating agency would serve to eliminate in-
stitutional silos and redundancies, thus potentially reduc-
ing turf wars. The elimination of silos would greatly in-
crease the effectiveness of building MDA, as information
gathering and sharing would be conducted under one
umbrella. There would, however, be costs to bear before
seeing the Bakamla as the single coordinator of Indonesia’s
maritime security. Setting up such a mechanism would
require rigorous institutional and legal overhaul. Existing
legislation would need to be reviewed and revised to ac-
commodate the Bakamla’s new role, which means
downsizing the less essential agencies (e.g. the Civil Ser-
vice Investigations Unit of the respective Ministries) and
integrating them into the Bakamla’s structure. Institutional
integration would also need to take into account the Min-
istry of Defence It would take tremendous effort to bring
together these agencies, and even more so to bridge exist-
ing differences.3
SEEING THROUGH THE GLASS DARKLY
The issue at the strategic level is that policymakers tend
to ‘see through a glass darkly.’ (Till, 2013, p. 338) It is
difficult to predict future trends in an increasingly com-
plex maritime domain, especially when the dynamics are
ever-changing. Though there may be adequate information
gathering measures at the operational and technical level,
the information needs to be refined and analysed so that
it can be turned into actionable intelligence that has di-
rect influence on national maritime policy. In other words,
at the strategic level, much of MDA activities centre on
‘sense-making’, or refining the ‘maritime image’. This in-
cludes mapping out trends and patterns and then using
these trends and patterns as a basis for analysing existing
maritime policies.
At the strategic level, the Indonesian Ocean Policy docu-
ment serves as an umbrella document for the formulation
of the GMF, but not the implementation. It has provided
a definitive interpretation of the GMF which envisions
Indonesia as ‘a sovereign, advanced, independent, strong
maritime nation that is able to provide positive contribu-
tion for peace and security of the region and the world in
accordance with its national interest.’ (Indonesian Ocean
Policy (Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia no. 16/
2017), 2017, p. Introduction) Though the document may
provide a shared interpretation of the goals of the GMF,
along with the key areas of interests related directly to the
GMF, the document itself cannot be seen as a document
that can unite existing programs under different minis-
tries. It ‘codifies and fleshes out the skeleton of the GMF’,
but does little in other areas (E. Laksmana, 23 March 2017).
Firstly, it lacks a provision for the establishment of a cen-
tral agency that has the power to control and coordinate
the many maritime programs under the existing ministries.
Secondly, the document provides little explanation as to
how domestic programs will be linked to regional mari-
time security programs. In the case of MDA, not only is
there little mention of the need for of domestic MDA ca-
pabilities, but also how Indonesian maritime security agen-
cies can use existing multilateral MDA centres to achieve
the objectives of the GMF.
Who would be able to shoulder the duty of ‘sense-mak-
ing’? Till proposes the formulation of maritime policy be
aided by an ‘informed commentariat’. The commentariat
would consist of independent elements, ideally from
academia/universities or civilian think-tanks. The scope
of the commentariat in Indonesia, however, remains small
(Till, 2015). Furthermore, interaction between maritime
security stakeholders and the informed commentariat has
been limited at best.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the course of Indonesia’s project to achieve
the Global Maritime Fulcrum, it has overlooked maritime
domain awareness as a crucial enabler despite having made
significant progress in physical naval development. We have
elaborated the myriad problems that Indonesia has in build-
ing its maritime domain awareness capabilities. These prob-
lems are apparent at all levels – strategic, operational, and
technical – and in many maritime security stakeholders,
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which include limited operational-technical capabilities due
to lack of relevant equipment, incoordination between the
prominent maritime security agencies, and a limited un-
derstanding of MDA at the strategic level. To address these
issues, we propose several policy recommendations.
A major hurdle in establishing a common maritime
image is a lack of coordination between the many mari-
time stakeholders in Indonesia. A ‘hub-and-spoke’ archi-
tecture would be an ideal structure for organising
Indonesia’s scattered maritime security actors (Bueger,
2015a). The Bakamla has the largest potential to become a
hub for MDA in Indonesia in coordination with the Co-
ordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs. As a hub, the
Bakamla would act as a facilitator for cross-agency capacity
building. It would be where the academic expertise should
be collated. Supervising the work of the Bakamla would
come under the duties of the Coordinating Ministry for
Maritime Affairs. The foundations of such a system would
be a robust intelligence-sharing network between the ac-
tors.
The creation of indigenous information fusion centres,
with functions mirroring the IFC and ReCAAP ISC, may
be a possible option for increasing Indonesia’s MDA capa-
bilities. These agencies should ideally be independent,
staffed with competent people, and have adequate links to
other such centres in the region. In the Indonesian con-
text, these centres ought to be government-run MDA cen-
tres run under a civilian-military partnership scheme.
However, due to the sheer extent of Indonesia’s maritime
domain, coupled with the many international interests
present in Indonesia’s surrounding waters, it becomes
important for Indonesia to look towards regional
neighbours for their support through bilateral and multi-
lateral initiatives. Existing initiatives tend to focus much
on Indonesia’s western waters, through schemes such as
the Indonesia-Singapore SURPIC II, the ReCAAP ISC
(to which Indonesia has yet to become a member), and
the Eyes-in-the-Sky trilateral surveillance initiative
(Supriyanto, 2017). In the eastern waters, Indonesia and
Australia would benefit from the formation of a joint MDA
centre. It would be best to make use of existing multilat-
eral MDA centres that exist in Southeast Asia. Indonesia
has yet to become a member of ReCAAP. By delaying
membership, Indonesia only stands to lose more in the
long run. Though Marsetio wrote of it being a shame that
external agencies know more of Indonesian waters than
Indonesia itself, Indonesia may be able to acquire knowl-
edge and expertise to build its own domestic MDA cen-
tres (Marsetio, 2014, pp. 58-59). Furthermore, by joining
regional MDA centres, Indonesia can also gain access to
their facilities and foster regional cooperation in maritime
security.
Considering the proximity of the regions in Southeast
Asia, maritime security should be a regional concern with
ASEAN members sharing the burden proportionately ac-
cording to their respective capabilities. However, there are
several issues that need to be addressed beforehand. In
the realm of security, a trust deficit between governments
— and even more so for maritime security stakeholders —
is apparent (Poole, 2015, pp. 156-157). This inhibits effec-
tive cooperation and ultimately, seamless intelligence shar-
ing that is fundamental for collective maritime security.
However, there have been steps to address this trust deficit
through more security cooperation initiatives. The ‘Our
Eyes’ initiative, proposed by Defence Minister Ryamizard
Ryacudu during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meet-
ing, should be a stepping stone towards further Indone-
sian involvement in building MDA. The initiative has been
said to be limited for counterterrorism, however, it could
serve as a starting framework for better maritime intelli-
gence sharing within ASEAN (Reuters, 12 October 2017).
In the end, to achieve the ambitions of the Global
Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia would need to seriously con-
sider not only the physical aspect of maritime development,
but also developing maritime domain awareness as an es-
sential enabler for its regional ambitions. The way to do so
is to not only rely on its own capabilities, but also by en-
gaging its regional neighbours.
END NOTE
1 In Indonesian strategic planning, there are three vital sea lanes
known as National Sea Lanes I, II, and III. These are currently
acknowledged as Indonesia’s archipelagic sea lanes in accor-
dance with UNCLOS. For further elaboration, see Sebastian,
Supriyanto, & Arsana, 2015
2 This added authority distinguishes the Bakamla from its
predecessor, the Bakorkamla (Badan Koordinasi Keamanan
Laut), which previously only served an information-sharing
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function. Personal correspondence with Colonel Salim, Chief of
Operation Strategic and Tactic, Naval Operation and Training
Service, TNI-AL, 12 December 2017.
3 Personal correspondence with Colonel Salim, 12 December
2017.
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